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The Shenandoah Campaign and Stonewall Jackson
In his fascinating monograph, Peter Cozzens, an independent scholar and
author of The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth (1997),
sets out to paint a balanced portrait of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign
and offer a corrective to previous one-sided or myth-enshrouded historical
interpretations. Cozzens points out that most histories of the campaign tell the
story exclusively from the perspective of Stonewall Jackson’s army, neglecting
to seriously analyze the decision making process on the Union side, thereby
simply portraying the Union generals as the inept foils to Jackson’s genius.
Cozzens skillfully balances the accounts, looking behind the scenes at the Union
moves and motives as well as Jackson’s. As a result, some historical characters
have their reputations rehabilitated, while others who receive deserved censure,
often for the first time.
After a succinct and useful environmental and geographical overview of the
Shenandoah region, Cozzens begins his narrative with the Confederate army
during Jackson’s early miserable forays into the western Virginia Mountains in
the winter of 1861, where he made unwise strategic decisions and ordered
foolish assaults on canal dams near the Potomac River that accomplished
nothing. Cozzens then follows Jackson into his first battle at Kernstown in
March 1862, a defeat in which Jackson grossly underestimated the force he was
attacking, and made no clear tactical or strategic plans for the battle leaving his
commanders to fend for themselves. Cozzens agrees with many historians who
condemn Jackson for his unreasonable arrest and condemnation of Brigadier
General Richard Garnett, who performed admirably under the extreme
circumstances. However, Cozzens starts to shift from the historical
interpretations when he analyzes Jackson’s command style. While pro-Southern
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historians have praised and celebrated Jackson’s notorious secretiveness and
refusal to share his plans with his lieutenants, Cozzens perceptively argues, in
dozens of examples throughout the work, that such a command quirk was
Jackson’s single greatest flaw, which time and again robbed him of a chance at
greater victories.
When Jackson’s army routed smaller Union forces at Front Royal and then
Winchester and marched toward Harpers Ferry in late May 1862, Lincoln
famously directed General Irvin McDowell to postpone his march toward
Richmond and redirect many of his troops to the Shenandoah Valley. Lincoln
has often been accused of stopping the movement because he feared for the
safety of the capital, but Cozzens places Lincoln’s motive in its proper context:
“There was no panic in Lincoln’s decision; no blind reaction to, nor even
mention of, a possible Confederate descent on Washington. Lincoln’s intentions
were aggressive; he would redirect McDowell in order to trap Jackson" (345).
While Lincoln ordered McDowell to cut off Jackson from the east, he also
ordered General John C. Fremont to do the same from the west. That neither of
these commanders succeeded in doing so caused Lincoln endless frustration.
Cozzens places the blame not on the commander in chief, whose strategic plans
were fundamentally sound, but on a variety of other human and natural factors.
First, McDowell did not obey the orders as promptly as he could, busy as he was
wallowing in self-pity; McDowell was extraordinarily dismayed at being ordered
to halt his march, and only grudgingly obeyed Lincoln’s directive. Second,
Cozzens argues that General James Shields, commanding the spearhead division
from McDowell’s corps, proved to be one of the most incompetent of Union
generals. While other generals acquitted themselves quite well, Cozzens
concludes, through a careful examination of the general’s actions, that Shields
deserves the censure that historians have heaped on him—for moving too slowly,
accepting erroneous intelligence that indicated he faced greater forces than he
did, and for disingenuously exalting his own role and condemning others in his
post-campaign accounts. Cozzens also freely scorns the excitable General John
W. Geary for fabricating threats east of the Shenandoah that distracted Lincoln
and McDowell. As far Fremont’s failure to cut Jackson off, Cozzens rescues
Fremont’s reputation in a small way. He makes a strong case that Fremont’s lack
of supplies and the nature of the terrain made it far more difficult for him to
execute the maneuver that Lincoln felt he should. Lincoln’s map showed only
the short fifty-mile distance Fremont had to cover, but not the daunting
mountainous terrain, weather difficulties, lack of roads, or near starvation of
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Fremont’s army. However, Cozzens does conclude that Fremont wasted
opportunities at Cross Keys on June 8 by being far too tentative.
Cozzens points out that the Confederate army had plenty of its own flaws
that prevented even greater successes. Not only should Jackson have been more
communicative, but Jackson was not well served by his cavalry commander,
Turner Ashby, who was frequently nowhere to be found. Jackson reprimanded
Ashby a number of times, even prompting Ashby to resign on one occasion
before Jackson convinced him otherwise. Jackson’s cavalry often provided
erroneous intelligence, as it did when it nearly disastrously underreported the
number of Union troops at Kernstown. Ashby and his ill-disciplined soldiers
frequently were nowhere to be found at the critical moments of battle. For
example, after routing the Union army at Winchester, Jackson’s cavalry was
absent when it could have potentially annihilated General Nathaniel Banks’
beaten troops. Jackson also comes under criticism for his tactical handling of
several battles. At McDowell, Kernstown, and most notably, at Port Republic on
June 9, Jackson’s piecemeal deployments caused far more casualties than
necessary. Cozzens also argues that despite the newspaper coverage that
apotheosized Jackson as the greatest Confederate hero, he was not, contrary to
popular myth, universally loved by his soldiers. The soldiers’ letters complain of
Jackson’s tactics, marches, and disinterest more than they celebrate his
successes.
While many of the details and interpretations that Cozzens gives will not be
entirely new to scholars, his careful analysis of the Union and Confederate
strategic and tactical decisions takes the campaign out of the pro-Southern
mythos and places it in proper historical context. However, Cozzens does make a
few assertions that scholars will debate. One of his interpretations that make this
reviewer raise an eyebrow is his conclusion that Lincoln, though with the best
intentions, ultimately made a mistake by ordering McDowell’s corps to suspend
its march to Richmond. Cozzens concludes, “With the weight of McDowell’s
added numbers, not even one so cautious or so apt to overestimate the enemy’s
strength as McClellan could have failed to capture Richmond" (508). Given
McClellan’s illogical calculations, it is too much to assume that with those
40,000 troops he would have become a different commander than he proved to
be during the war. This is certainly a leap of faith that many scholars would not
be willing to make. Another minor flaw is that the book could have used more
maps of the Shenandoah region throughout the narrative, rather than force the
reader to constantly return to the small regional map on page 14. However, these
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minor flaws notwithstanding, Cozzens has written a balanced, well-paced,
well-researched account. Replete with astute and circumspect judgments, this
work should be properly afforded the distinction of the definitive,
comprehensive account of Jackson’s Valley Campaign.
Judkin Browning is assistant professor of history at Appalachian State
University. He has published articles in journals such as The Journal of
Southern History and Civil War History. His book, The Southern Mind under
Union Rule: The Diary of James Rumley, Beaufort, North Carolina, 1862-1865
is forthcoming from the University Press of Florida in 2009.
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